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Chapter One
The Challenge of a Democracy Beyond the
State in the European Union
Mario Telò 
Building a democracy beyond the State is a difficult challenge, as thefirst European attempts in the history of the human being well
show. It is an inevitable step for true democrats, because the traditional
national democracies are increasingly unable to cope with the transna-
tional and supranational challenges of our time: addressing financial
unbalances, building an international order and facing new security
threats, limiting climate change and environmental degradation, regu-
lating migration flows, combating infectious diseases, fighting against
transnational criminality, drug traffic and terrorism.1 It would not be
serious denying the open and increasing contradiction between the
supranational nature of the most important challenges of our time and
the national limits of the democratic State.
However, even defining “democracy beyond the State” is not an easy
task. Theoretically, we are exploring a research field that is epistemolog-
ically off-limits for the mainstream U.S. neorealist school of Interna-
tional relations2 because according to them democracy has nothing to
do with the international realm. It is also out of reach for the French
“republican” tradition, which still asserts that democracy can be imple-
mented only at the national level.3 For this innovating endeavor we
need to take stock of critical approaches to International relations while
combining them with comparative politics and European studies.
On the basis of the current academic debate, we could define democ-
racy beyond the State:
1. David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jürgen 
Habermas, Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, no. 4, 2003, pp.86–
100. 
2. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading Massachusset: Addison Wesley
Publishing, 1979).
3. Gauchet M. L’avènement de la démocratie. I: La révolution moderne, (Paris: Folio Essays, 2013).
3
(a) As an institutional settlement of democracy among the States—con-
ceptually opposed to democracy within the State.4 Of course, in the
EC/EU understanding, transnational institutions and transnational citi-
zenship do interact with domestic democracy and citizenship in multi-
ple ways: on the one hand, every member of the EU supranational dem-
ocratic polity in the making must be (“Copenhagen criteria,” 1993), and
remain (Article 7,TEU) a democratic State, since transnational democ-
racy is impossible with unreliable pre-constitutional States. Austria was
the target of intergovernmental political sanctions in 2000 due to a
national government considered as xenophobic by the other 14 EU
members. The problem is that, compared with the decade of the “liberal
peace” following 1989, façade democracies are increasing in number
and arrogance5 not only outside the EU, like Russia, but also within, like
Hungary. 
On the other hand, once established, intergovernmental and supra-
national institutions develop a complex interplay with national democ-
racies6—defined as a multiple and multifaceted “Europeanization”
process,7 acting both bottom-up and top-down. The first theoretical
question to cope with is the dynamic and changing relationship between
democracy within the State and democracy beyond the State in the
troubled context of the early 21st century.
(b) We need also a further conceptual distinction. While the confed-
eral concept of democracy is focusing on the democratic nature of mem-
ber States represented in the multilateral bodies like the Council of
Ministers and the European Council, a democracy beyond the State in
Europe looks as closer to—even if not coincident with—federal democ-
racy. Contrary to a democratic polity constructed by sovereign but
interdependent States (e.g., the United Nations assembly), the Euro-
pean supranational democracy building process has been compared with
the democratic path constructed according to the Hamilton’s model of
U.S. federalism.8 Both share the need to cope with the theoretical chal-
4. Kalypso Nikolaidis and Paul Magnette, “The European Union’s Democratic Agenda,” in
Mario Telo, ed., EU and Global Governance, (London & New York: Routledge, 2009), pp 43-
63.
5. Larry Diamond, In Search of Democracy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
6. Philip C. Schmitter and al, Governance in the European Union, (London: SAGE 1995).
7. Claudio Radaelli and Susana Borras, “The Transformation of EU Governance, the Open
Method of Coordination and the Economic Crisis,” in Maria Joao Rodrigues and Eleni Xiar-
chogiannopoulou, eds., The Eurozone Crisis and the Transformation of European Governance,
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp 41-57.
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lenge firstly addressed by Montesquieu: how to combine democratic cit-
izens’ representation with the need to protect the demos from external
threats? A small State is close to the citizens but weak within the inter-
national arena, whereas the big State is strong against external threats
but far from domestic audience. The union of multiple States within a
federal State is the best possible compromise according to Montesquieu
and the American federalists. 
The European federalist thought is one of the main sources of inspi-
ration for transnational democracy indeed (from Spinelli to De Rouge-
mont). However, if not disentangled from the federal State tradition9 it
would be associated with the teleological perspective of building in
Europe a kind of second United States. Nobody speaks about democracy
beyond the State in the U.S., while for Europe, given the deep historical
roots of various nations and member States, the distinction between the
federal State model and democracy beyond the State is of crucial rele-
vance. What firstly matters is the conceptual independence of these two
concepts from one other.
(c) A second source of inspiration for a democracy beyond the State
is the tradition of cosmopolitan democracy. Differently from the tradition
of federal democracy, the cosmopolitan concept of democracy is clearly
far from a State model, as Immanuel Kant already stated more than two
centuries ago.10 Yet both concepts focus on cross-border relations
among individuals and social groups, independently from—or parallel
to—inter-State relations. Both traditions draw the attention on social
ties, on mobility and relations at level of civil societies, on the plurality
of social and institutional actors networking across national borders.
The political philosophical background of both innovating approaches
has to be found in the work of Immanuel Kant rather (as recently
revived by Habermas and others) than in Montesquieu. 
However, the experience of the European Union shows the differ-
ences between cosmopolitan democracy and democracy beyond the
State. While the first one is focusing on the universal dimension, which
8. Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe, (London: Allen Lane, 2002); Sergio Fabbrini, Which 
European Union? Europe After the Euro Crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
9. See Olivier Beaud ,Théorie de la Fédération, (Paris: PUF, 2007); Nicolas Levrat éd. in coop-
eration with Frédéric Esposito, Europe: de l’integration a la Fédération, (Louvain-la-Neuve, Ac-
ademic –Bruylant, 2010).
10. Immanuel Kant, Treaty for Perpetual Peace, 1795.
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entails universal values, notably human rights protection (Held,
Archibugi 2000), the second one is a political concept and a more con-
sciously limited concept. When we discuss a transnational democracy beyond
the State in Europe we address the question of the construction of a democratic
system limited to a certain territory, developed not at the global but the
regional level, in the sense of a territorial region of the world, including borders
and frontiers. Even the most open concept of borders entails a distinc-
tion between insiders and outsiders, and also the intermediate status is
legally fixed (status of “candidate country”). On the one hand, transna-
tional and territorially based democracy could be conceived as a step
towards the cosmopolitan utopia; on the other, it could also be devel-
oped as an independent and political project. 
In this second version, it entails a complex relationship between
democracy and a political decision making process based on a particular
region, a distinct territory and grouping of States. Even if Europe is not
a State and probably will never become one, it is already a regional
polity, a political project as proved by the two political pillars of CFSP
and JHA as well as by the Euro, which is a political project. The project
of building up a democracy beyond the State means in Europe a limited
transnational democratic polity, with borders. The EU is, however, a
particular polity, compared with the universal dimension of the cosmo-
politan vision.11 The distinction between Europe and the World is
much more evident in the 20th and 21st century than at the times of
Kant.12 Neglecting this crucial difference would with right provoke
multiple and serious criticism by non-European scholars, even beyond
the post-colonial school of thought.13 Even within the European conti-
nent, some States (Turkey, Russia or other States) could decide, by free
decision, to stay out (or exit from, like the UK) of the EU transnational
democracy project and establish friendly neighborhood relations.
Cosmopolitan thought is challenged. The Habermas approach14 is
characterized by an internal tension: on the one hand, he and his school
revived the cosmopolitan tradition in relation to Europe, focusing on
11. Kalypso Nikolaidis and Robert Howse, eds., The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of
Governance in the United States the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
12. Anthony Pagden, ed. The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
13. Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
14. Jürgen Habermas, “Toward a cosmopolitan Europe’. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4,
2003, pp. 86–100. 
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transnational networks and bottom-up citizen’s participation, the need
of combining parliamentary democracy with a public sphere, all ele-
ments which are essential to transnational democracy. On the other
hand, when talking not only about a European “public sphere” but also
including elements of European “republicanism” (“constitutional patri-
otism” according to the Habermas language; see his recent ARENA
paper on European democracy 2014, as well as Fossum and others) he
emphasizes the political dimension of a European transnational democ-
racy, its clear distinction from cosmopolitanism and from the global or
continental (in its broadest understanding) dimension. 
What are We Learning from the EU’s experience?
Europe is, by general assessment, the most sophisticated laboratory
of transnational democracy beyond the State. According to the EU/EC
Treaties, since Maastricht (1992), the citizen is twice sovereign, as mem-
ber of his/her nation and as member of the European Union (Articles 9
and 10, TEU). A “common citizenship” is announced in the Lisbon
Treaty Preamble: it entails the recognition of the rights, freedoms and
principles listed in the “EU Charter for Fundamental Rights” and
makes explicit reference, in Article 6 of the TEU, to both the European
Convention for Human Rights and the member States constitutional
traditions. The European citizenship includes several rights: free mobil-
ity not only as a worker, as it was since the early Rome treaty (now Arti-
cles 45-48, TEU), but as an ordinary citizen, which breaks with the tra-
ditional identification of national citizenship and residence.
Furthermore, it includes the right to vote (at local and European level),
petition, and diplomatic representation. The provisions related to the
European space of freedom, security and justice further deepen several
aspects of transnational democracy and citizenship.
Moreover, the gradually enhanced power of the EP, from 1979 to the
Lisbon treaty, was the flag of several generations of European democ-
rats because it was expected to compensate the citizens for the dimin-
ished national parliament sovereignty provoked by the centralization of
the EU decision making process, with the national sovereignties sharing
and pooling process (within the Council and the European Council),
strengthening supranational regulations and empowering the Council
of Minister (and the national governments) against the respective
national parliaments. Well, what we have learned since the early nineties
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(notably after the Maastricht Treaty ratification referenda, “no” in Den-
mark and short “yes” in France in 1993) is a kind of paradox: despite
tremendous progresses of the European parliament as its co-decision power with
the Council is concerned, the Eurosceptical feeling of a European democratic
deficit is stronger then ever.
Further strengthening the EP powers as strongly called upon by fed-
eralist movement (F. Herman, G. Verhofstadt, Cohn Bendit, and others,
according to the Altiero Spinelli tradition) on the one hand, was neces-
sary given the evidence of the declining EC/EU’s early “substantive
legitimacy”15 provided by the high economic efficiency during the
thirty Golden years; but, on the other end, it looks as insufficient to
cope with the social consequences of the hardest economist crisis since
the 1930s provoking the explosion of populist movements. 
Already ten years ago, before the financial crisis imported from the
U.S., the Constitutional Treaty rejection in 2005 and the Lisbon Treaty
difficult ratifications in 2007-8, were totally unexpected. The new evi-
dence is that, combining relevant steps towards “federal” centralization
at supranational level (treaties of Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2000, Rome
2004, and Lisbon Treaty, 2007) with enhanced parliamentary power is
absolutely not enough to cope with the largely diffused popular feeling
of a too far decision making process combining technocratic governance
and intergovernmental hidden negotiations. The strengthening of the
EP continued until the top reached with the full co-decision power with
the Council, provided by the Lisbon Treaty. However, never the
Euroscepticism was so strong and diffused as in the last decade. This
paradox was already addressed by the scholars in the 90s16 when the
emergence of the limits of the idea of importing from USA the Hamil-
tonian tradition paved the way to a more complex and mature under-
standing of democracy beyond the State. Actually, European referenda
are becoming nightmares for Europhiles and no government (with the
single and paradoxical exception of the UK) asks for new Treaty revision
because of the fear of serious complications during the national ratifica-
tion process.
15. Joseph H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?’and
Other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1999).
16. Mario Telò, ed., Démocratie et Construction Européenne, (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université
de Bruxelles, 1995) Eric Remacle and Paul Magnette, eds., Le Nouveau Modèle Européen, (Brux-
elles: Editions de l” Université de Bruxelles, 2000).
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Which remedy? It is well known that, in order to understand and
address this theoretical challenge, F. W. Scharpf proposed to distinguish
between output legitimacy (based on the efficiency of EU policies and real
benefits for citizens) from input legitimacy (based on proactive citizens’
participation). On that basis, a various political stream supported by aca-
demics suggest to make of the EU democracy something more similar to
national democracies, and of the European Parliament something more
similar to national Parliaments, notably the Westminster Parliament,
ignoring that the EP was—and still is—a “strange” Parliament.17
Should and could the increasing democratic deficit of the EU demo-
cratic system be addressed by a process of political polarization of the
European electorate according to the left-right cleavage and could the
European Parliament consequently change according to the Westmin-
ster model? In other world, should transnational democracy beyond the
State become more politicized, similarly to the cleavages of domestic
politics of larger States? 
The comparative political science school led by Simon Hix18 focus-
ing on elections, parliaments and parties, is supporting this perspective,
by underlining the actual and potential similarities with national poli-
tics. Consequently this school is fostering the transformation of the EP
into a true political Parliament electing the Commission on a political
basis (according to the left-right cleavage). This change is expected also to
counteract the declining turnout and mobilize the citizens’ participa-
tion. Well, the provision of the Lisbon Treaty related to the election of
the Commission President by the Parliament (TEU, art 17.7) looked to
many as paving the way to this perspective. Actually, this politicization
process made some progress in 2014, with the Spitzenkandidaten indi-
cated by the 5 main EU parties and the eventual election of the winner,
the leader of the winning party—the EPP- notably Jean-Claude Junker,
as the new President of the European Commission. However, there is
some relevant caveat: the campaign in many countries was not at all
inspired by this political innovation (the Spitzenkandidaten were not
even invited to put their foot on the UK soil for example). 
Secondly, the more political and “politicized” new Commission,
chaired by Jean- Claude Junker, is not a politically homogeneous gov-
17. Pascal Delwit, Jean-Michel De Waele, Paul Magnette, eds., A Quoi Sert le Parlement Eu-
ropéen?, (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1999)
18. Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, (Basingstocke: Palgrave, 1999).
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ernment of the EU: it is a matter of facts, that both the Commission
internal political composition and the large supporting parliamentary
majority correspond to a “consensual”19 democratic model, including a
multiplicity of actors and interconnected levels of governance and,
politically, both center-left and center-right parties, rather than to a
Westminster democratic majority democratic model. The EU transna-
tional democracy beyond the State is definitely much more comparable
with consensual democratic national systems, like Austria, Belgium, and
Switzerland than to the UK; and some of its forms are consistent with
the particular ways of deliberative democracy by addressing internal
conflicts/disagreements and justifying binding decisions.20
All in all, notwithstanding the innovations, the European transna-
tional democracy experiment beyond the State confirms its distinctive
features and cannot be confused with classical national majority system
democracy. Politicization according to the classical right-left cleavage,
only to a limited extent fosters citizens mobilization and is not the
panacea: the turnout remains relatively low (less than 50%) and 17%
was won by Eurosceptical parties, which made it necessary to build a
“great coalition” (3 parties, EPP, Social Democrats and Liberals) elect-
ing and supporting the Junker Commission. All in all, in Europe,
transnational democracy beyond the State will hardly follow the
national democratic model, notably the model of great powers like UK
or France or US. The special circumstances of the existence of many
European demoi instead of a single European demos,21 the internal dis-
crepancies and divergences increased with the Eastern enlargement, the
extremely sensitive issue of the fair balance between smaller and larger
member States,22 the relevant unbalances of the constituencies electing
EP parliament members in various countries, all make it impossible to
apply the Westminster model of majority democracy. Not only but the
consensual and centripetal EU experience has inspired similar consen-
sual and/or “ technical” governments in several Member States.
19. Arendt Leijpart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
20. Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thomson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004).
21. Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4,
2003, pp. 86–100.
22. Kalypso Nikolaidis and Paul Magnette, “The European Union’s Democratic Agenda,” in
Mario Telo, ed., EU and Global Governance, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp 43-63.
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For similar reason (obstacles to trivial transplantation into the EU
system of national models), the multiple proposals of recovering the
legitimacy deficit by the direct election of the President of the EU,
combining the two functions of Commission president and European
Council president, is typical of intellectuals who are underestimating
the consequences of the complexity of the EU system and the impossi-
bility of over simplification following the example of strong national
democracies. In conclusion, it is very doubtful that a political European
transnational democracy beyond the State should replicate the domestic
politics of the larger States like France, UK or the USA.
The EU laboratory shows that transnational democracy beyond the
State is not only a multilevel but also a mixed an multiform polity.
While following—as experts- the works of the European Convention
(2002/2003), we tried to conceptualize the four forms of EU transna-
tional democracy included in the new draft-Treaty and transferred four
years later in the text of the Lisbon treaty (TEU, art 9-12): 
1. A central body of representative democracy as the legislative power
is concerned (EU Parliament, or EP) completing the second leg-
islative body (the Council of Minister) and balancing the executive
power shared by Council and Commission and the juridical power
(the Court of Justice); the relevant status acquired by the EP fos-
ters an increasing role of European political parties.23
2. An incipient multilevel parliamentary system, including not only
the EP but also the participation of national Parliaments (TEU,
Article 12, and Protocol n.1, attached to the Lisbon Treaty with
the “early warning” procedure); 
3. A structured social transnational democracy, strengthening the
socio-economic side of democratic participation, by underpinning
the role of social partners dialogue, both between them and with the
Commission and the rotating Presidency (Spring social forum),
which includes the social dimension of democracy within the
European decision making process (TFEU, Article 154, 155). The
Socio/Economic Committee is also a form of representative social
democracy (TFEU, Part 6, Title 1, chapter 3,1 consultation bod-
ies), combined with the territorial representation of sub-national
entities, like the European Regions (TFEU, Part 6, Title 1, Chap-
23. Robert Ladrech, Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis,
Keele University paper , 2001
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ter 3,2). Decisions regarding employment and social policies are
taken after interplay with social partners and consultative bodies.24
4. A fledging European public sphere, legally framed by treaty provi-
sions for enhanced transparency, consultations, and also the first
steps towards a participatory democracy (according to Article 11.4,
one million citizens could “invite the Commission to make a pro-
posal” to Council and Parliament (however, a disappointing record
of implementation has to be mentioned). Public sphere is also
matter of civil society participation, multilingual media like
Euronews, dialogue between the EU institutions and churches,
local powers, experts, transnational networks and lobbies, etc.
This institutional complexity of the democracy beyond the State has
an obvious implication. Each provision for a European transnational
democracy entails distinct legitimacy procedures: direct (EP) or indirect
(European Council and Council of Ministers) election; technocratic and
substantive efficiency; openness and dialogue with civil society.
A large debate is open regarding the link between democratization
and constitutionalization. On the one hand, the need for a coherent
framework and for a general consistency of the transnational demo-
cratic system would call, according to relevant scholars, for a written
constitution, a constitution not only beyond the national State but also
without a federal supranational State; and without a single demos.25 On
the other hand, according to an alternative approach,26 a constitutional
process, without a written Constitution, better fits with the specific and
complex nature of the European polity. The history of European con-
struction and notably three failed attempts to approve a constitutional
treaty suggest the second option as the most appropriate.27
24. M. Joo Rodrigues and Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou, eds., The Eurozone Crisis and the Trans-
formation of European Governance, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
25. Jürgen Habermas ,Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4, 
2003, pp.86–100 
26. Joseph H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?’and
Other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1999).
27. Sonia Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti and Viven A. Schmidt, Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy
in the European Union, (Abingdon: Routledge 2010). 
12 CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS NEIGHBORS
Democracy beyond the State as a Work in Progress: 
New Challenges for Research
Multiple relevant research agendas are emerging in the current times
of uncertainty, and deepening the distinctive political perspective of
European transnational democracy we presented in this chapter,
notably: A) theoretically, a third way between the federal and the cos-
mopolitan concepts of democracy beyond the State; B) empirically,
exploring a complex political way to transnational democracy in Europe
which cannot be identified to trivial and oversimplified copies of
national democracy and is confronted with a globalized and disordered
world. We limit our review to some ongoing research projects:
The Impact of the Eurozone Crisis on the Transnational Democratic
Process and the Risks of Degradation of the EU Internal Multilateralism
The Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen did recently draw the atten-
tion on the increasingly dramatic link between the current socio-eco-
nomic crisis and the possible dissipation of previous achievements in
democracy, internal multilateralism and social ethics.28 At a recent con-
ference Sen addressed the question of the negative interplay between
the quality of the European democracy and the contents of the eco-
nomic policy. In his words, a policy of austerity would undermine the
social basis of democracy, while an alternative “Social-democratic eco-
nomic policy” would not. In principle, this argument is not easy to
accept: how a particular economic policy and a distinctive ideology
should be more coherent with democracy, whereas others—like the
Liberal or Christian or Green—would not? However, there is no doubt
that the current social crisis and the long lasting austerity policy-
adopted by every national government—was affecting the European
transnational democracy in many ways. 
We are witnessing a paradox: the EU is expanding democracy
beyond the limits of nation State, while the EU integration risks
empowering executives and lobbies which are more able to quickly
adjust to the supranational dimension. Secondly, the Commission and
ECB popular perception as bodies “governing by numbers” within the
28. Amartya Sen, in Actes Du Colloque La Démocratie, Enrayée? F.De Smet, ed., (Bruxelles:
Académie, 2014).
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context of a “multilayered regional governance,” is de facto increasing
populism while limiting the national government’s policy agenda.29
Moreover, even accomplished progresses in crisis management and in
anti-crisis policy efficiency often result in enhanced democratic deficit
both at the national and EU level. For example, there is a little doubt
that the key moment of the Euro-crisis solution was the famous sen-
tence of July 2012 by Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, saying
that “the ECB was ready to do whatever in its power to save the Euro.”
Did the ECB, by these very effective declarations, become the political
government of the EU? This was the perception by a large swath of
public opinion. Trivial and populist oppositions of national democracy
to supranational technocracy were addressed. Even if the ECB Presi-
dent Mario Draghi acted only after the 21 June 2012 European Council
green light, there is no doubt that the perception of the President of the
ECB as “the EU’s most powerful political leader” was and is problem-
atic from the democratic theory point of view.
Efficiency by crisis management, if framed by austerity policy, looks
to many as contradictory with the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s
decision making. Research is critically analyzing stereotypes as the
Greek criticism to “EU and German diktats” are concerned. It is a mat-
ter of facts that both Southern crisis-States (like Greece) and Northern
creditor States are democracies. Not only Tsipras is a legitimate winner
of democratic election but all EU member States leaders; for instance,
A. Merkel has to look for the internal legitimation by the German Bun-
destag, Bundesrat and Bundesverfassungsgericht (supreme court). Secondly,
the bodies of the European democracy beyond the State were not truly
marginalized: democratic procedures matter more than the usual over-
simplification by Eurosceptic criticism. For example, the European Par-
liament role, notably its “negative” role, its critical function is resilient,
as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty reform and the procedures of co-
decision. Thirdly, the concept of “best practices” draws the attention on
the relevant role of some national democracies, notably Scandinavian
parliaments and parliamentary committees, by developing democratic
accountability of the EU council of Ministers and the need of diffusing
these examples within the EU member States. 
29. Philip C. Schmitter and Zoe Lefkofridi, “A Good Crisis or a Bad Crisis for the EU?’ in
Maria Joao Rodrigues and Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou, eds., The Eurozone Crisis and the Trans-
formation of European Governance, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp 11-28.
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What is more pertinent in the Sen critique? The EU’s transnational
democracy is framed by a dynamic multilateral polity represented by
the Council of Ministers, the Euro-group (18 members of euro), and
the European Council. Contrary to domestic democracy, this intergov-
ernmental multilateral framework is crucial and only an idealistic pic-
ture of Europe may ignore that this is a pillar of the EU “beyond the
State democratic polity” since the EU’s legitimacy cannot be built
against the States but in cooperation with them. Well, as a consequence
of the hard intergovernmental negotiations, the EU’s internal multilat-
eralism looks to critical observers as gradually transformed into a
increasingly hierarchical decision making process: the intergovernmen-
tal cooperation is increasingly influenced either by power relations, or
affected by populist domestic pressures, which is inevitably undermin-
ing to some extent the mutual trust, and making the room for transna-
tional democracy narrower. We know from experience and scientific lit-
erature that multilateralism is normatively based on two principles: the
first is the “generalized principle of conduct” which is opposed – by def-
inition—to hegemonic or imperial relations, which entail a hierarchical
dimension;30 and the second is “diffuse reciprocity.” 
The first principle is no longer respected when uneven application of
the common rules and procedures occurs. This is relevant for the EU
case, since derogations to the “Stability Pact” rules have been welcomed
for Germany and France in 2003, while not for Portugal at the end of
the decade. On the other hand, this is relevant also by analyzing oppo-
site cases: for example, the same austerity rules risked of not being of
application for Greece after the 2015 elections, while Spain, Ireland,
Portugal and other countries had to implement them is a strict way in
2012-15. Also rejecting the general principle of conduct by exploiting
its own national weakness as more than an argument, a weapon, is
inconsistent with transnational democracy beyond the State while con-
sistent with a populist downgrading of national democracy. 
A promising research field is precisely the dynamic interplay between
transnational democracy and the changing EU’s internal multilateral
set, on the one hand, and the troubles of national democracies, on the
other.
30. James A. Caporaso, International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for
Foundations, in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, edited
by John Gerard Ruggie, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 51-89. 
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The Social Dimensions of Transnational Democracy beyond the State:
Deepening Diffuse Reciprocity and Bridging with Neighbors
The second principle of multilateral cooperation affected by the cri-
sis—“diffuse reciprocity” has been opposed to “specific reciprocity” by
Robert Keohane in 200331 and by myself in 2013. This principle means
that the exchange among States may evolve from mere cost-benefit cal-
culations (do ut des, as in specific reciprocity), towards two deeper
dimensions: firstly, expanding the time dimension of the exchange
between partners, which implies an enhanced trust between them. Giv-
ing and receiving back do not need to be simultaneous exchanges as in
specific reciprocity. Secondly, a diffuse reciprocity means making issue-
linkage possible: the fields of the multilateral exchange may be quite
diverse and interplaying with one another, from trade to economic
cooperation, from political dialogue to financial cooperation, from com-
mitment to human rights protection to fight against the climate change.
Diffuse reciprocity is the way for transnational democracy expansion in
the experience of the EU democracy beyond the State and between the
States. 
On the basis of a large literature on social exchange, political scien-
tists (for example Anna Caffarena 2008)32 analyze the role of mutual
trust as a “social capital” composed of diffused reciprocity, networks of
social relations and social norms, and its current decline in
bilateral/multilateral interstate relations as a major problem.33 Accord-
ing to this point of view, what is needed is reviving and further institu-
tionalizing the social capital of mutual trust by fostering rich relation-
ships of dialogue, communication, shared long-term aims and
cooperation, which should be underpinned by transnational democratic
networks. The simple fact that even the Westphalian Treaty of 1648
revived the principle of “friendship” as a necessary context for a success-
ful peace treaty (The Christianity during the Middle Ages underesti-
31. Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations. International Organization,
vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 1–27. 1986
32. Anna Caffarena, “Couples and Trust Building in International Society. A Social Capital
Perspective,” paper presented at ISA Annual convention, San Francisco 2008 
33. Russel Hardin, Trust, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) (quoted by Anna
Caffarena, ivi) James S. Coleman, Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital. The
American Journal of Sociology, n. 94, 1989, pp. 95-120 (quoted by Anna Cafferana, Ivi); Robert
D. Putnam, Democracy in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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mated the concept of friendship), we do understand that this social capi-
tal is really essential for the EU democracy to survive the crisis.
However, let’s imagine that the internal trust and friendship is truly
revived, strengthening the internal solidarity within the Euro-group of
18 countries. Would a successful process of “bonding” of peoples of
similar sort discourage “bridging” and openness to neighbors? In other
words, it is possible that developing diffuse reciprocity, friendship and
solidarity within a limited regional polity (as a domestic democracy, or
even the Euro-group) make more difficult openness to other external
actors, people of a different sort, to candidate States, or to the universal
dimension? Which balance is wise between bonding and bridging in the
current world characterized by connectivity and conflicts? Under which
conditions are trade-offs possible?
Along a similar research strategy, the social scientist Maurizio Fer-
rera underlines in a forthcoming book chapter the internal “fault lines”
aggravated by the economic and social crisis notably between South and
North as shown by the conflict between Greece and Germany.34 Well,
in the current critical juncture, transnational democracy needs, on the
one hand, a long-term idea of solidarity where what looks as a cost in
the short term may be seen as a gain for every country including the
creditor ones in the long term. On the other hand, the crisis-States
should never forget two things: firstly, that a multilevel transnational
democracy needs to fairly respect also the national democracies of credi-
tor countries; and secondly, that the post-1945 process of reconciliation
between aggressors and victims of WW2 is a “common good,” a pre-
cious achievement without which transnational democracy would be
impossible. German leaders have been universally and many times rec-
ognized as sincere in apologizing for Nazi war crimes. Ignoring how
hard this catharsis has been, and undermining it for instrumental pur-
poses would be irresponsible. Jacques Delors quoted in 2012 Hannah
Arendt and her plea in favor of the couple “pardon and promise,” as a
precondition to create a Weberian-style Vergemeinschaftung, or “neigh-
borhood communities“ based on spatial proximity. This double principle is
a founding value, a regional “common good,” for the peaceful and dem-
ocratic relations between Germany and all the victims of the Nazi
34. Ferrera, M . “Governing the European Union after the ‘Phase Change:’ New Ideas, New
Values,” in Van Middlelaer L /Van Parijs Ph., eds., What is the Future of Democracy in Europe
and Can the Union be Part of it?, (Brussels: Lanoo, 2015).
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regime within the common European home.35 A democracy beyond the
State needs this historical and social background.
The Internal/External Dimension of Democracy. 
We are approaching a third big issue for democracy beyond the State
within the EU limits. The question how to combine two classical chal-
lenges for constitutional States: internal democracy and external policy.
In comparative terms, the Swiss case is an interesting laboratory. On the
one hand, if an even exemplary national democracy only focuses on the
first, it risks several traps (for example, isolation, or referenda raising
international problems, with the consequence of forcing the govern-
ment to look for compromises with neighbors (as is happening after the
referendum of 2014, about the free cross-border movement of people).
On the other, one has to keep in mind how the need of avoiding the risk
of weakening the citizens’ representation side and provoking massive
internal contest. It is increasingly impossible to consolidate domestic
participatory democracy without developing transnational democracy
beyond the State and is impossible to develop transnational democracy
without an enhanced shared collective security framework. 
This issue is relevant also for other EU Member States who may
develop the practice of participatory democracy and national referenda
to address relevant dilemmas, including both enlargement of the EU
and exit from the EU. How to combine national traditions of participa-
tory democracy and free public opinion with openness and notably the
recognized need of an enhanced cooperation between the hard core of
the Eurozone and the surrounding circles, including the neighbors and
in particular candidate countries? The current de facto evolution
towards a “multi-speed Europe,” by concentric circles architecture, may
be the best available solution. The strengthening of the Eurozone eco-
nomic governance (and internal legitimacy) may be compatible with a
larger transnational European polity and democratic framework,
respecting national cultural diversities and including all the multiple
trans-democratic dimensions, from social solidarity to the convergence
on a humanitarian and mainly civilian common foreign policy.
35. Ibid.
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The Internal/External Dimension of Democratic Legitimacy Facing the
Increasing Relevance of External Opportunities and Threats. The
European Transnational Democracy and the Global Level
Europe is not an island and European states are not the only ones
who are facing what Norberto Bobbio defined in 1989 as “the external
limits to democracy” (power of external actors, States, multinational
companies, violent networks and other international threats).36 Interna-
tional autonomy is the precondition for the quality of democracy: how
does European transnational democracy interact with the surrounding
disordered world? This research field is at the crossroad between com-
parative regionalism, EU studies and international relations/globaliza-
tion studies: are international relations and globalization limiting the
efficiency of a democratic polity by protecting citizens’ sovereignty?
How to cope with these external limits in Europe and at macro regional
and global level? Is the enhanced a diffused call for global governance
(regarding the financial imbalances, poverty reduction, coping with
challenges such as climate change, terrorism, criminality, infectious dis-
eases, etc.) contradictory with democracy at the national, global and
regional levels?
a) At the regional level. Proximity and neighborhood matter and
transnational democracy may affect domestic democracies. For example,
the EU may play a more proactive role by expanding democracy to both
candidate countries and partners of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. The
development of transnational democracy (parties, various kind of net-
works, inter-parliamentary dialogue, and so on) may be more relevant
on the one hand to prevent steps back in the democratization process of
weak regimes that have met minimum standards of democracy, and on
the other hand, to press authoritarian regimes to democratic pluralism,
both in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean sub-region. Often,
democratic transitions need social, economic and cultural linkages to
established Western national and transnational democracies. After the
end of the optimism of the 1990s about a global third wave of democra-
tization (Huntington 1991), regionalism and geographic proximity are
more concrete and efficient resources for democratization than the
global agenda. The EU as a favorable neighbor may press for demo-
cratic consolidation in a way that is an alternative to the “U.S. way”:37
36. Norberto Bobbio, I limiti della democrazia, (Torino: Einaudi, 1989).
37. See U.S. New Security Strategy 2002.
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provided a correct trade-off between bonding and bridging, EU and can-
didate or neighboring countries may develop transnational linkages at
level of civil society in a broader understanding. Against the enhanced
assertiveness of alternative authoritarian regimes and their growing
attractiveness in the name of economic efficiency in the current global-
ized economy, strengthening linkages become more important than in
the 1990s. For example, open immigration and asylum policies, net-
works at the level of municipalities, companies, universities, advocacy
groups, parallel to trade negotiations, may not only spotlight violations
of democratic rules, but also enhance the resources of local democratic
forces.38
b) We focused this chapter on the process of building a democracy
beyond the State at regional level, notably in Europe, including mem-
bers and surrounding countries. However, even at the global level,
transnational democracy may be developed, in the context of a multi-
level model of cosmopolitan democracy (which is quite far from the
classic Kelsen model). Robert Keohane, the leader of neo-institutional-
ist International relations studies, addressed what he defined as this
growing “governance dilemma”: the more we need supranational gover-
nance to cope with the limits of national democracy, the more we need
democratic governance at a transnational level. Every level of gover-
nance, whether national, regional or global, is to some extent increas-
ingly challenged by a democratic deficit that is enhancing the efficacy
deficit as well. Secondly, this kind of governance dilemma should be
addressed by “less contingent forms of democratic legitimacy” com-
pared with the golden times of the Bretton Woods multilateral system.39
His former pupil, A. Moravcsik, pretends that democratic deficit is not
relevant for the EU, composed by democratic States and democratic
governments, which meet in the Council and European Council.40
What is more and more evident is that we need to be exploring a third
way between the realistic approach of Moravcsik and the utopian view
of Held. What Andrew Moravcsik argues is true but insufficient given
the increasing relevance of transnational governance for the citizens’
38. Stephan Haggard, Democratization during the Third Wave. Annual Review of Political
Science, in press.
39. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Garnet Paper, 2004.
40. Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit:” Reassessing Legitimacy in
the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, pp. 603-624.
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life: a distinctive and specific development of democracy beyond the
State is needed. Moreover, contrary to the cosmopolitan view, the Euro-
pean concept of democracy beyond the State is a political project at the
regional level (similarly with the process occurring, by alternative ways,
in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and other regional entities), including a terri-
torial political dimension and multiple circles of membership. Which
are the main components of a less contingent legitimacy of transna-
tional democracy? On the following points the EU experiment of a
democracy beyond the State may be seen as a forerunner of a multi-
faceted global tendency:
• Output legitimacy means that democratic governance beyond the
State should provide true benefits for the ordinary citizens.
Transnational democracy cannot be legitimate in a context of eco-
nomic failure and missed security provisions. A positive trade-off
between efficiency of transnational governance and democracy is
essential. 
• Knowledge and democracy: epistemic community legitimacy, educa-
tion are the soul of democratic life at transnational level, balancing
the shift towards technocracy and contingent legitimacy.
• Accountability: the fight against corruption of non-national institu-
tions should be more reliable (at every level of transnational
organization including staff and budget), and mainly organized at
the national level.41
• Representation: no transnational democracy at the global level with-
out a profound reform of the shares within the organizations.42
The Western States’ inevitable withdraw from dominating posi-
tions in the legacy of WW2 and Bretton Woods could be balanced
by a enhanced joint action of regional entities, among them the
cohesion of the hard cores, notably in the EU.
• The role of shared values. Non-contingent democratic legitimacy
should increasingly be also based on shared values. But against
Eurocentric approaches, balancing universalism and relativism will
be crucial: every region shares distinctive “cognitive priors,”43
among them various understandings of universal values, different
41. Charlotte Ku and Harold Jakobson H.(eds) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in
International Law, (New York: Cambridge university Press, 2003)
42. Amandina Orsini, ed., EU in International Organizations, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
43. Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).
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combinations between procedural and substantial democracy, indi-
vidual and social rights. A third level of norm setting between the
national and the global is emerging in many continents. The
agenda of normative transnational democracy will be increasingly
affected by macroregional features.
• Input legitimacy at regional level should be more able to address external
governance, and if possible global governance: multiple forms of dis-
tinctive democratic participation (even if they cannot trivially
replicate national democracy features: regional parliaments,
regional social dialogue, regional citizens’ direct participation,
involvement of national parliaments, involvement of sub-national
bodies, from sub-national regions to municipalities...). 
Europe remains a unique laboratory for combining multilevel
democracy and diffuse reciprocity among States. Contrary to the idea of
a “post-modern Europe as an island within a modern world,” the need
of a transnational democracy beyond the State is rising up within other
regional contexts: for example, the ASEAN Charter (2007), the Parlasur
within Mercosur, the African Union parliament… Comparative
research between regional entities is strongly fostered addressing the
question of the various regional forms of transnational democracy
beyond the State. And transnational democracy is also relevant as the
multiple interregional partnerships between regional democratic bodies
are concerned, like TTIP, ACP, the Mediterranean dialogue, Rio
Process: the role of NGOs, transparency, balance between democracy
and institutionalized dispute-settling mechanisms. The emergent inter-
regional ties are not only structural features of multilevel global gover-
nance (in the context of the decline of global multilateralism) but also
potential components of global democratization44 inter-parliamentary
dialogue, transnational advocacy and knowledge networks among
national/regional institutions, political parties, universities, cities,
unions, interest groups…
It is an innovative, fresh, bottom-up approach to the democratic
agenda beyond the State avoiding one of the most negative scenarios: a
process of internal bonding that makes bridging impossible. That would
mean avoiding the risk of “a Swiss paradox” at a large scale (deepening
44. Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri, “How Does the European Parliament Contribute to the
Construction of the EU’s Interregional Dialogue?” in F. Baert, T. Scaramagli and F. Söderbaum,
eds., Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions, Global Governance, and the EU, (Heidelberg: Springer
Dordrecht, 2014), pp. 129–50.
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regional social and diffuse transnational democracy at the expenses of
openness and bridging with surrounding countries) and place the EU
experiment of a republican democracy beyond the state as a driving
force of a larger multilevel process of democratization.
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